A new tax credit to help low-income families and individuals purchase health insurance can address the problem of affordability, but will not overcome other barriers these populations face in obtaining coverage. This paper proposes that families have the option of using a new tax credit to buy into a state-administered system such as Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program. This option has three advantages. First, it allows families to remain with a single health program and health plan as their income fluctuates. Second, it provides an alternative to the complex and confusing individual insurance market. This alternative is community rated, does not use underwriting, and allows health plan behavior to be monitored closely by the state. Third, it allows the state to act as a financial bufferhelping overcome the barrier to participation that cash-flow problems and year-end reconciliation concerns are likely to create among a low-income population. Many people would want to use their tax credit in the private market, but the buy-in option increases the likelihood that the tax credit approach would succeed.
This paper outlines a program that would permit individuals and families 1 eligible for a health insurance tax credit to buy into a publicly administered insurance system, such as Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Tax credits can achieve their goal of expanding health insurance coverage only if currently uninsured people have an effective mechanism for purchasing insurance with their new credit. Alone, tax credits address only the issue of cost; a plan that provides tax credits but does nothing more will continue to leave many people uninsured. Even today's affordable programs are underused. For example, while high premium costs are the primary reason people give for not buying health insurance (Hoffman and Schlobohm 2000) , many people who are eligible for free coverage under Med-icaid or the new State Children's Health Insurance Program do not enroll. The program described here would provide families with an existing group that could accept their credit, manage the enrollment process, and assure a reasonable benefit package.
This so-called ''buy-in'' option offers three primary benefits. First, it provides continuity of coverage for low-income families as their incomes change. Because eligibility for most public programs is tied to income, small increases in earnings may cause some families to become ineligible. The buy-in program assures that they may remain in the same insurance plan, even as their income rises and they become eligible for a tax credit. Second, it provides an alternative to the complexities of the nongroup market. This plan assures that there is an affordable, al-ready existing option for those who want to use their credit to obtain new insurance coverage. Finally, by placing an intermediary between the family and the federal government, it allows for a design that avoids the risks inherent in a year-end reconciliation process. Families concerned about the possibility of making insurance premium payments during the year, only to find that their tax subsidy has fallen short at year's end, might prefer to participate in this program.
The infrastructure of Medicaid and SCHIP could be expanded easily to provide an option for new entrants into the insurance market. Although many families might wish to use a new federal tax credit to purchase private insurance, extending an existing infrastructure of plan choice, consumer education, and premium collection to these families has many advantages. States already dedicate many resources to Medicaid programs that provide health insurance to low-income families. More recently, states have used the significant flexibility granted under SCHIP to simplify eligibility and expand outreach (Health Care Financing Administration 2000) . Welfare reform formally broke the link between Medicaid and cash assistance, providing new impetus for states to treat their health insurance programs as support for lowwage working families, not just welfare recipients. At the same time, Medicaid and SCHIP programs are becoming increasingly privatized, with private firms providing consumer education and enrollment functions, and private health maintenance organizations (HMOs) overseeing the delivery system (Holahan et al. 1998 ).
The buy-in option presented here would be an adjunct to a tax credit of $2,000 for individual coverage and $4,000 for family coverage for people with incomes up to 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL). The credit would phase out at higher incomes. The credit would be available to anyone who purchases health insurance and who is not at the same time covered by employer-sponsored insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or SCHIP (Zelenak 2001) . The buy-in option would be, as its name implies, an option. While an eligible family might buy into public coverage, the family instead could use the tax credit to purchase private insurance in the open market.
States would have strong incentives to make the buy-in option available to their citizens, but they would not be required to do so. States would submit their own implementation plans to the federal government, process enrollment applications, and obtain the federal tax credit issued on behalf of enrolled families.
Interested families would apply for the federal tax credit through their participating state agency. The state would calculate prospectively the premium costshare required by the family. States would be expected, but not required, to develop a zero-premium plan-that is, one that requires no out-of-pocket premium payment by a family or individual receiving the full federal tax credit. Other options that require the family to pay a premium beyond the value of the tax credit might be available. A state also could supplement the federal tax credit using its own revenues, in whatever manner it wished, to expand benefits, reduce cost-sharing, or expand the choices available to participating families.
Together, state and family choices would determine the number of tax credit recipients who would participate in the buy-in option. If an area's private, nongroup insurance market were strong, relatively few families might participate in the buy-in. But for those that did, this program almost certainly would convert otherwise uninsured families into insured ones. In states where the private, nongroup insurance market was weak, this option might be essential for tax credits to achieve the goal of increasing health insurance coverage.
The History of Related Efforts
While this paper describes a new program, it builds upon state experience extending Medicaid programs to higher-income families.
Experiences with Programs for Families
From the family's perspective, state buy-in programs would look similar to those already adopted by a handful of states through waivers granted under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act. For example, Minnesota and Tennessee each have programs that allow families with incomes above the normal Medicaid qualifying levels to purchase, on a sliding fee scale, into a program that also serves many families with lower incomes. The Washington Basic Health Plan, although not operated as a 1115 waiver, has a similar structure (Krebs-Carter and Holahan 2000) .
While the financing structures that underlie each of these programs differ, they share a common feature. Every program has attracted some people who presumably could have purchased health insurance in the nongroup market, but who found the state-administered program more desirable. While it is possible that some of these families would enter the private market if the state program did not exist, it is more likely that they would be uninsured. Therefore, state buy-in options to expand the availability of health insurance have demonstrated, albeit on a limited scale, that they can reach people who find the nongroup market undesirable or unavailable.
Experiences with Similar Federal-State Models
From a federal-state perspective, this proposed program would be quite different from Section 1115 waiver programs. Most Medicaid waiver programs, once budget neutrality is negotiated, continue to operate on a standard cost-sharing system between the federal government and the states. That is, states report their expenditures under the program, and the federal government pays its share at the Medicaid match rate. If the number of eligible families increases or declines, or the per-eligible cost changes, the federal payment to the state changes accordingly. While the SCHIP match rate is higher than that for Medicaid, the mechanics of the program are similar.
In the program described here, the federal government's only obligation to the state would be to remit the tax credit on behalf of the taxpayer. Management of program costs would be entirely at the risk of the state. From the federal government's perspective, this design is much simpler than the current Medicaid program. From the state's perspective, the program would operate as any other, with costs and appropriations calibrated to program need.
As discussed later, the state plays a new role in this model. The state would gather tax credit eligibility information from individuals and use that information to determine the funds it should receive from the federal government. This relationship might be complex, but it is essential to the proposal.
Target Population
The buy-in option is likely to appeal to only a subset of the population eligible for tax credits. To identify those most likely to take advantage of this option, it is worth reviewing who would be eligible for the new tax credits. Tax credits would go to low-and moderate-income families, but would not be available to anyone with employer-sponsored insurance or Medicaid or SCHIP coverage.
These rules create three categories of families. The first category includes families with children with incomes below 200% of the FPL. Most of the children in such families are eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP, but most of the adults are not eligible for any form of public coverage. 2 The second category includes families with children with incomes above 200% of the FPL; in most of such families no one is eligible for public coverage. The third category consists of adults without children regardless of income, who, except in a very few states, are not eligible for any form of public coverage unless they are disabled. By definition, to be eligible for a tax credit these families would have to have at least one currently uninsured person. The question is whether the new tax credit would lead the uninsured members of these families to obtain health insurance.
Each of these groups is large. Data from the 1997 National Survey of America's Families shows that of the 21.1 million low-income (below 200% of the FPL) parents, 7.3 million are uninsured. Fifty-seven percent of the children of these uninsured parents are uninsured themselves, while 34% have Medicaid coverage (Dubay, Kenney, and Zuckerman 2000) . Among higher-income parents, 2.5 million, or 6%, are uninsured. Finally, 17 million adults without children are uninsured, of which 9.6 million are low income. Fully 38% of low-income adults without children are uninsured (Holahan and Brennan 2000) .
The buy-in program has potential advantages for all three types of families, but the advantages are greatest for the first type. Children in families in this category are already eligible for public coverage (although, as the previous data show, many of these children are not enrolled). If there is no buy-in option, a family has two choices for using its tax credit. First, the parents can use the tax credit to buy a nongroup policy while the children remain enrolled in Medicaid. In this case, the parents and children are covered by different health plans, creating complexity and possible barriers to receiving timely, necessary services. The family also can pull the children out of Medicaid or SCHIP and buy a family policy using the family tax credit. In so doing, the family enters the mainstream health insurance market, but almost certainly receives a narrower benefit package for its children. Also, in the fairly likely circumstance that the tax credit is worth less than the cost of a family policy in the nongroup market, the family will face a premium. That premium (net of the credit) may be small and will not pose a barrier for all families, but for others it may make this second option unrealistic or unattractive.
If this low-income family could use the parents' tax credit to buy into the state's Medicaid or SCHIP program, the family would retain the Medicaid or SCHIP benefit package for the children and have a single insurance plan covering all family members. This prospect should appeal to many families. New health insurance would be provided for very low-income parents, and access to services for their children might improve, as the whole family would need to navigate only one delivery system. This also might improve enrollment rates for eligible Medicaid and SCHIP children, since the entire family would be able to obtain insurance, not just the children.
The buy-in program also might appeal to some families and individuals in the latter two categoriesthose without children eligible for SCHIP or Medicaid, or without children at all. For these families, the buy-in option would provide an alternative to the nongroup market. If the buy-in plan offered a good benefit package compared to that available in the private market, and a provider network perceived as high quality, some families might prefer this option to nongroup coverage.
Administration

State Role
The state would play a role in administration only for those families that chose to participate in the buy-in program. That is, the core tax credit would be administered in its normal fashion for families that used it to purchase private coverage.
As proposed, state participation would be voluntary and depend upon the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (DHHS) approval of a state plan. The state would begin by extending its existing Medicaid or SCHIP program to a new group of enrollees. This extension would involve the same activities these agencies currently perform-enrolling clients, educating them about their options, signing up managed care plans or providers, making capitation payments, or paying claims directly. In all of these areas there would be some marginal increase in volume, but no substantive change in the work of the agency. Presumably this expansion would benefit from some economies of scale for program operations, as well as the possibility of enhanced purchasing and bargaining power for the state. Thus, from the perspective of administering the benefits, program administrative costs likely would be small.
The program would involve a new role for the states: an intermediary between individuals and the federal government. A tax credit-even one that is refundable and payable over the course of the tax year-must be reconciled at year end. 3 That is, the precise value of the credit only can be determined once the tax return is filed and the taxpayer's income and eligible expenses are known. As noted by Zelenak (2001) , this feature of a tax credit might discour-age some families from participating, especially those who are uncertain about their earnings for the coming year and apprehensive about having to repay large sums of money to the government at the end of the year.
A critical component of the buy-in option is that the state would buffer the individual from the uncertainty inherent in year-end reconciliation. That is, the state would make a determination at the time of application of what the expected family credit will be through the balance of the year, and the federal government would have to accept that determination as final, thereby eliminating reconciliation. The plan submitted by the state to the federal government should include the methods the state would use to determine eligibility, with the expectation that there would be some federal audit of this activity. An alternative would be to have states turn over a portion of the application process to the federal government to prevent any concerns that states might over-qualify individuals. Yet another option is for the state to bear the risk of its own errors. In this way, the state would reconcile with the federal government at year's end, based upon the difference between the value of the credits the state claimed at the beginning of the year and the sum of the credits actually owed to the families on whose behalf it claimed them. 4 All of these options involve some complexity. Longer periods of eligibility might help reduce administrative costs and attract families. But if the state bore the risk of losing federal funds when a family's income rose, it might want to require more frequent redeterminations of eligibility. If the federal government bore the financial risk, it also might demand more frequent redeterminations. This tension between accuracy and simplicity is inherent in the design of this program, and it is critical that policy balances these priorities.
While the idea that states could claim a federal tax credit may seem odd, it is commonplace for states to administer federally financed benefits. The application process currently employed for most public benefits-such as cash welfare (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF), Medicaid, food stamps-requires states or counties to make prospective determinations of family eligibility for benefits based upon historical financial information. Eligibility is assured for a certain time, ranging from a month to as long as a year, regardless of changes in family circumstances. In each of these programs, federal funds are involved, and there is a reasonable chance that, if eligibility were not approved, the costs of serving these families would fall entirely to the state. For Medicaid and TANF, eligibility standards vary tremendously from state to state, even though federal benefits are at stake. An alternative model is provided by the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. SSI is a federal program administered by the Social Security Administration with eligibility determined in part through state-run disability determination systems. SSI demonstrates that it is possible for states to perform an eligibility function for a federal program.
For applicants, full state administration is far preferable. Still, the need to avoid a year-end reconciliation is so central to the success of the buy-in option that any allocation of responsibilities between the states and the federal government that achieves this goal must be considered.
If states were to administer the program, each would develop an application form that collects information about the applicant's expected income for the tax year. Based on this information, the state would calculate an estimated tax credit for each family. Each month the state would submit a claim to the federal government for payment, which would be the sum of the estimated tax credits for all families eligible for that month. This amount represents the full obligation of the federal government to the state, and it would be expected to cover health care costs as well as program administration.
Maximum income eligibility for the buy-in option would be left entirely to each state to decide. For families with incomes higher than the level at which the federal tax credit would phase out to zero, there would be no federal financial involvement, so this program would function just as any other state-only program would. For the purposes of this analysis, any families with income that high are ignored. States could set a lower income cap than that currently proposed for the phaseout, although there is no particular reason why they would do so.
Families who received the maximum federal credit, and whose credit covered the full cost of insurance, would become in essence part of the Medicaid or SCHIP eligibility pool. Since the target group for this program is lower-income families eligible for the maximum tax credit, and given the structural advantages of setting up the state program so that families need not make additional premium payments, it is reasonable to expect that most program participants would fall into this category.
For families receiving only a partial credit, or where there is no zero-premium option, the state would need to collect the balance due from the family. Models for this sort of collection exist in Section 1115 waiver states and many SCHIP programs. Requiring premium payments increases administrative costs and reduces program participation, but does differentiate the program from ''welfare.'' There is sufficient variation in state approaches within current Medicaid and SCHIP programs to suggest that there is no national consensus on the appropriate degree of premium cost-sharing. State choices under this new buy-in option presumably would continue to reflect this variety. At the end of each tax year, the state would provide the federal government with a list of the Social Security numbers of people participating in the state program. Participants would be barred from claiming the federal tax credit on their tax return. People who moved from one state to another mid-year would need to apply for benefits in the new state; even though eligibility for the tax credit would be uniform nationally, other aspects of the buy-in program might differ.
Federal Role
The Department of the Treasury would be responsible for most of the tax credit's administration. As discussed earlier, the federal government would make payments to states on behalf of eligible families who chose to participate in the buy-in program. Oversight of the buy-in programs themselves would rest with the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) within the DHHS. As with SCHIP and Medicaid, states would submit a plan to the secretary of DHHS. Upon approval of the plan, each state would become eligible to receive tax credit funds directly from the federal government on behalf of eligible families. I am not aware of any examples of situations in which an individual tax credit can be claimed directly by an institution on the individual's behalf, but this seems a plausible arrangement.
Program Detail
Eligibility
This program is best viewed as an optional state-designed and state-administered purchasing vehicle for low-income families eligible for a new federal tax credit that they can apply toward health insurance.
State responses are likely to fall into three categories. Some states might take a minimal approach to implementation, and develop a zero-premium plan for families eligible for the full federal tax credit. Program eligibility would be limited to these fami-lies, and the program would require no premium collections. From the state's perspective, once these families were enrolled, they would be treated much like other families in SCHIP or Medicaid.
Other states might take a moderate approach to implementation, and open their plans to families that receive only a partial federal tax credit. These families would have to pay the balance of the premium themselves. While this would necessitate premium collections, it would require no premium subsidies by the state.
Finally, a third group of states might use their own funds to subsidize the federal tax credit or to extend eligibility, and possibly subsidies as well, to families with incomes above the tax credit phaseout level. Experience with Section 1115 waivers suggests that relatively few states would be likely to take this expansive approach in the first years of the program. However, if successful models emerge, this might become a more attractive option later on.
In all three cases, eligibility would be determined by a state agency-presumably the Medicaid or SCHIP agency-based upon a state-designed application. Since the federal tax credit would be tied only to family income and purchase of health insurance, there would be no reason for the state to require information on matters other than income. If the state wished to place other restrictions on eligibility, such as the unavailability of employer-sponsored coverage, it would be able to do so.
Covered Benefits
Under the program described here, states most likely would offer benefits comparable to those provided by Medicaid and SCHIP. SCHIP seems the more likely model, since states already have grappled with the issue of how to design a benefit package that would benefit the nonwelfare population. However, SCHIP benefits were designed for children, and the buy-in option would have to address the rather different health care needs of adults. Therefore, while the premium cost-sharing, copayment structure, and general nature of benefits for the buy-in program likely would resemble those in the state's SCHIP program, the actual list of covered services might be somewhat different.
I have emphasized an option that allows people to buy into the Medicaid or SCHIP programs, but there is no particular need for it to be identical to either of these programs. For example, if the value of the federal tax credit were less than the state's current costs per enrollee in Medicaid or SCHIP, the state might develop a more limited benefit plan, so that eligible families would be able to enroll in some form of health insurance without having to pay anything. If the credit were worth more, the state could even expand benefits.
It is difficult to predict how states would design their benefits given a tax credit of $2,000 per individual and $4,000 per family. In 1995, Medicaid expenditures per nondisabled adult exceeded $2,000 in 15 states (Liska, Brennan, and Bruen 1998) . This suggests that some states would be unable to offer a no-cost plan without making significant modifications to existing Medicaid benefit packages. But these data do not contain enough information to predict what insurance for the currently uninsured would cost compared to Medicaid. The risk profile of tax credit users compared to current Medicaid enrollees would have an effect on the benefits that could be covered. 5 The newly insured might have pent-up demand for services. At the same time, Medicaid adults include a disproportionate share of pregnant women, who cost more compared to the general uninsured adult population. Finally, Medicaid coverage is defined at the individual level, while the tax credit would be available for families, making comparisons between the two systems difficult. 6 It is legitimate to ask whether the buy-in option would be attractive if the tax credit fell short of the cost of the existing Medicaid benefit package. But the more appropriate question is how the buy-in option would compare with what people likely would find in the nongroup market. Premiums for single adults with employer-sponsored coverage averaged almost $2,000 in 1996 (Branscome et al. 2000) . In two-thirds of the states for which data are available, Medicaid expenditures per adult recipient in 1995 were less than or equal to employer-sponsored single coverage in 1996. Medicaid costs are even more favorable if they are compared to the nongroup market. Therefore, while the tax credit might not finance existing Medicaid and SCHIP benefit packages entirely, it might buy more than what exists in the nongroup market where most people might otherwise use them.
What states do would depend partly upon the existence of other coverage options for this population. For example, a state with a generous Medicaid spenddown program and strong systems of health care providers that deliver free or subsidized care might prefer to scale back the buy-in benefits and let other parts of the health care system pick up the uncovered population. A state with a less generous health care system might use its own funds to expand buy-in benefits so coverage in that program would be comprehensive. Of course, the willingness of different states to use their own funds to subsidize insurance coverage for low-income people will vary, and will influence the approaches they take.
Plan Choice
The simplest approach would be for states to place all buy-in enrollees into the same managed care plan with SCHIP or Medicaid enrollees within a given geographic area. This would simplify enrollment and health plan relationships. However, in states that offer Medicaid enrollees a choice of plans, there is no reason those same choices should not be made available to buy-in participants. As long as benefits are standardized, and concerns about risk selection thus are minimized, enrollee choice can help assure quality. In addition, choice would make the buy-in option more attractive. Therefore, it makes sense for states to provide their buy-in enrollees with the same choices they give other public program participants.
A more complex option is for states to operate more like private purchasing cooperatives for their buy-in participants. In this case, the state would contract with multiple health plans, perhaps including plans that do not participate in Medicaid or SCHIP. States also might select plans with different premiums, and pass on the differential to the buy-in participants. Since this model functions like a purchasing cooperative-except that in this case the cooperative is publicly administered-I leave discussion of the merits of this option to Curtis, Neuschler, and Forland (2001) .
Regulation
Underlying the tax credit approach is the assumption that individual purchasers will make decisions appropriate to their own needs without significant additional regulatory oversight of the market. Since the buy-in program would offer consumers an additional option, there would be no reason for the federal government to regulate the state buy-in program any more than it regulates the private insurance companies that offer plans to the public.
However, one important feature of the buy-in design would place the state in a different position from other parties. As discussed previously, the state would determine eligibility for benefits. Federal oversight of the enrollment process would be warranted, since the state's actions could lead directly to the federal government having to make payments to the states.
A separate regulatory issue arises concerning the relationship between the applicant and the state. It is possible that the state could unduly influence an applicant's decision to participate in the buy-in program, rather than to use the tax credit in the open market. Therefore, some federal regulation would be appropriate to ensure that the state-administered program makes it clear to the applicant that the buy-in is only one of a number of options.
Design Details and Issues
Program Coordination
Enlisting the states as partners in implementing the tax credit would provide some benefits for other programs. Enrollment in Medicaid and SCHIP might become more appealing for families if they knew that coverage would continue as their income changed. Similarly, parents might be more likely to enroll their children in SCHIP or Medicaid if coverage for the entire family was available from the same source. Just as the earned income tax credit required a public campaign to expand its use, a health care tax-credit campaign might be necessary; it easily could be coordinated with similar campaigns for SCHIP that are currently underway.
From a programmatic perspective, coordinating the buy-in option with other programs such as SCHIP and Medicaid would not be complex. Since individuals would not be eligible for the tax credit if they were enrolled in SCHIP or Medicaid, the buy-in process simply could screen for enrollment and decline those who already were in one of these other programs.
Some families might have difficulty understanding their options. A family in which one or more children were enrolled in SCHIP or Medicaid might want to consider disenrolling from the public program to purchase nongroup family coverage using the federal tax credit. This is an odd possibility to contemplate, but one that is implicit in the tax-credit design. The buyin option actually would make the issue easier for the family because it would create an option that is not disruptive while making family coverage a possibility.
Enrollment
Families would have three reasons to take advantage of the buy-in option. First, income qualification would be determined in advance, so there would be no risk of retrospective reconciliation or year-end payments to the government. Second, the delivery system would be the same as that for Medicaid and/ or SCHIP, so families moving in and out of eligibility for those programs would retain continuity of coverage and caregivers. Finally, the choices available to families would be structured, avoiding the complexities of negotiating the nongroup insurance market. While all of these benefits would be available to families of all incomes, I assume they would be most appealing to those at the lower end of the income scale.
In order for lower-income families to find the tax credit a sufficiently strong incentive to make large health insurance payments during the year, they would have to be assured that they would not face a large year-end bill based upon changing financial circumstances. Therefore, it is essential that the state buy-in program be designed with family costs determined at the time of application, with no possibility of retroactive consideration, except in cases where incorrect or fraudulent information was given. This stands in contrast to a tax credit that is calculated along with the year-end tax return, where the family would be expected to make insurance premium payments during the year long before it knows the ultimate value of the credit.
It is likely that children in many of the families that would benefit from the buy-in program are already on SCHIP. Now their parents would be able to use the tax credit to purchase their way into the same HMO or other delivery system that the children already are using. This benefit is difficult to quantify, but is particularly important to consider in the context of outreach efforts currently being implemented in the SCHIP program.
The tax credit would not be available to people with employer-sponsored health insurance. Therefore, this state buy-in option would be the only alternative to the nongroup market. Nongroup coverage has high administrative costs and, even with relatively strong market rules, only moderately effective risk pooling. The state buy-in might offer a family more value for its money than the nongroup market. Of course, the possibility that the program would be stigmatized as ''welfare-like'' might offset any benefits to the family.
Low enrollment in this program could reflect either of two possibilities: the state might not be running a very effective program, or the private market might be functioning so well that no one views the state program as desirable. Poor state administration could mean complex enrollment processes, poor advertising of program availability, limited benefits relative to the private market, or a network of providers viewed as low quality.
Yet, buy-in program enrollment alone would be the wrong basis for judging the program's success. The overall goal of the tax credit, with or without the buyin option, is to reduce the number of people without health insurance. If that were to happen, regardless of where people enrolled, the program would have been a success. Certainly, if enrollment in the buy-in program were very low, the state might choose to drop it. If that occurred, the loss to families would be small.
Crowd-Out
Tax credits are not a particularly efficient strategy for reducing the number of people without health insurance because some of the credits will be used to reduce current contributions made by employers or premium payments made by insured people. Therefore, the program described here must be designed to maximize the likelihood that currently uninsured people will use it to buy coverage. The most significant factor for most families will be the value of the credit, but an important second factor will be the choice of insurance products and their prices. A full discussion of how much of the credit would simply substitute for existing coverage is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the buy-in option should increase the appeal of the tax credit for the lowest-income beneficiaries, thereby improving the efficiency of the overall approach.
A different kind of crowd-out is the possibility that states would reduce their financial responsibilities at the expense of the federal government. People would not be eligible for the tax credit if they were enrolled in Medicaid or SCHIP. If this definition were taken literally, a family could pull its children out of Medicaid or SCHIP, receive a tax credit for them, and purchase family coverage. From a family's perspective, this might or might not be a good deal-depending upon the size of the credit, the availability of nongroup family coverage, and the quality of the Medicaid or SCHIP program. But from the state's perspective, this swap is an unambiguous gain. Some or all of the members of the family would move from a program that has a state match to a federally funded tax credit. 7 Of course, this issue arises with the tax credit in general, not just with the buy-in option-although the concerns may be greater with the buy-in. If states had a financial incentive to move families from Medicaid to the tax-credit funded system, they might design a buy-in option specifically targeted at currently enrolled Medicaid families. In the end, this strategy is probably easier to imagine than to design. Still, the possibility that states might shift some of their financial responsibility to the federal government should not be ignored.
A simple response would be to reduce the federal Medicaid grant to states for each person who claimed the tax credit but also appeared, based upon the limited information available on a tax form, to be eligible for Medicaid. 8 The problem with this approach is that there are many Medicaid-eligible adults and children who are not enrolled. If the tax credit achieved its objective of drawing from the currently uninsured, the state would lose funds even though it experienced no savings in its Medicaid program. An alternative approach might be to reduce the federal grant only if Medicaid rolls declined. Unfortunately, the appropriate measure of the savings to the state is the difference between actual Medicaid costs and what they would have been without the tax credit. This cannot be measured solely by counting falling Medicaid caseloads.
It would be difficult to measure precisely how many of the costs associated with the tax credit came from savings in Medicaid. Similarly, it would be highly controversial and difficult to measure how much the tax credit reduced private contributions toward health insurance (the traditional notion of crowd-out) and cost-shifting to private payers for uncompensated care. If the tax credit successfully reduced the number of uninsured, it would have achieved its goal. Along the way it also might reduce costs for some other parties (individuals, providers, employers, states). There is no practical way to recapture all of these savings and it might be unproductive to attempt to do so.
Selection
This program would be subject to the risk of adverse selection, like any insurance product in a voluntary market. The degree of selection would depend largely upon how the nongroup market functioned. At one extreme, if the nongroup market were fully community rated, there would be no reason to think anyone would join the government program instead of the nongroup market for reasons related to risk. At the other extreme, a nongroup market that priced on the basis of risk would not appeal to high-risk individuals, and those people would have an incentive to enter the community-rated state program. One could even imagine all participants in a state's high-risk pool shifting over to the buy-in program if it were available to them.
It is impossible to predict how much adverse selection would occur in the buy-in program. The most straightforward response to this concern is to pair the tax credit with reforms in the nongroup market. However, the tax credit would be a federal program, and nongroup regulation is under state control. A federal requirement that states amend their insurance rules certainly would be controversial. The factors that make selection more or less likely-rating and underwriting practices in the nongroup market, the health status of those eligible for the tax credit, and the quality of the buy-in insurance product-all vary across states. This suggests that, in the absence of federal rules, the likelihood and degree of risk selection also would vary across states.
One possible policy response would be to erect barriers to keep high-risk individuals from shifting into the buy-in program. Waiting periods, or exclusions from the program if other sources of coverage are available, could address some of the selection problem. Such policies have been employed in other government programs and could apply here. They create some administrative complexity and deny coverage to some needy people, but they might ease fears of adverse selection. Another form of barrier is to scale back the benefit package or use tightly managed care, making the buy-in program less attractive to a high-cost population. But these barriers might make the program less desirable for other people as well.
An alternative would be to try to redirect dollars currently used to pay for health care services for high-risk individuals into the buy-in program, if people were to shift into the program. The high-risk population can be found in state high-risk pools, in Medicaid spend-down programs, at the upper end of the nongroup market, and among the uninsured paying out of their own pockets and sometimes creating uncompensated care burdens for providers. It should be possible to redirect funds from high-risk pools if demand for those programs shrunk substantially. Medicaid funds would not need to be reallocated, since that population already relies upon public funds. However, if there were a wholesale shift of people from the high-cost end of the nongroup market into the buy-in program, there would be no straightforward way to capture those costs.
While these are serious concerns, they must be put in the context of the broader possibility that the tax credit, especially if its value were not sufficient to cover the cost of an adequate insurance policy, primarily would attract higher-risk people. If this happened in a state with restrictions on underwriting and risk-based rating in the nongroup market, prices for everyone in that market would rise. If it happened in a state where the nongroup market did not have these regulations, those interested in using a tax credit would find no one willing to sell them policies. Thus, concerns of risk selection are not restricted to the buy-in program and they should not lead us to reject the buy-in option. They are integral to the tax-credit approach, and should be addressed in that context.
Competition with the Private Sector
One concern with this model is the possibility that state governments would be viewed as competing with the private health insurance market. Certainly this program could siphon some people out of the nongroup market. Risk selection issues aside, it is difficult to view this negatively. People would participate in this program only if they considered it a better value than the nongroup market. If that were the case, the benefits of providing health insurance to low-income families would be greater. That seems a more important concern than whether newly insured families primarily gain their insurance through the state or through the nongroup market.
Insurance companies and agents might view this issue differently. Insurance firms would be unlikely to be affected, since Medicaid has moved from being primarily a fee-for-service program to one that largely contracts with private managed care companies. While companies might prefer not to have the state as an intermediary between the enrollee and the plan, the business of insurance would remain in the hands of insurance companies, without competition from the public sector.
For insurance agents, the tax credit could mean a large, new clientele, but if people went to the state rather than the agent, that business would be lost. This is a legitimate concern, but if the private market functioned well, and provided new, valued options to this low-income population, presumably most of the business would flow into the nongroup market. If, on the other hand, people did not feel that the options in that market were desirable, they would consider the state buy-in program.
The politics of this issue would be significantly more complex if program benefits and administrative costs were less than the value of the credit, and there was a sense that states were skimming a portion of the federal tax credit. If administrative costs were comparable between private insurance and the public program, this could not occur because the private sector would compete effectively with the public program. But nongroup administrative costs are high, and a state program that built upon an existing Medicaid infrastructure might have much lower costs. Because the value of the tax credit would be low, it is difficult to imagine this occurring, but it is a risk that must be avoided.
Keeping the Program Current
The value of the tax credit presumably would be scaled to meet the typical cost of a nongroup insurance policy. However, the buy-in option would become less desirable the farther that credit fell below the state's costs of delivering the benefits under Medicaid or SCHIP. If the credit were worth less, and the state wanted to keep its program simple by providing a zero-premium option, the state would either have to subsidize the credit or offer fewer benefits than Medicaid. The first option is simple, but expensive. The second option adds significant complexity and partly reduces the purpose of the buy-in option. These alternatives are not terribly important for the population with incomes above 200% of the FPL because some premium cost-sharing would be expected. But for the lower-income population-the target of this program-these issues are significant. Therefore, regular updating of the value of the tax credit to reflect market conditions would be important for the buy-in option to succeed.
The Program from the Enrollee's Perspective
A potentially eligible person would apply at the county social services agency or any outreach organization the state designated, as states have for SCHIP. The application would require information on earnings, enabling the state and the federal government to determine the estimated tax credit available to the applicant for the balance of the tax year. The state would indicate to eligible applicants that insurance was available at the price set by the state, taking into consideration the federal subsidy the state expected to receive. From that point, the applicant would be treated like any other enrollee in a stateadministered insurance program.
To avoid the possibility of gaming, and to reduce administrative complexity, a family could not enroll in the buy-in for one part of the year while claiming the tax credit for another part of the year. State collection of the tax credit on behalf of eligible families would occur on a monthly enrollment basis, so mid-year enrollment simply would affect the number of credits claimed by the state.
There is always a difficult trade-off between requiring families to enroll at a specific time, which reduces risk selection, and allowing enrollment at any time, which encourages greater participation. As a practical matter, mid-year enrollment is likely to occur when a person appears at a medical facility and that facility, desiring payment, seeks to enroll the person in a plan. If the buy-in program relied upon managed care contracts, plans would demand a higher capitation rate if mid-year enrollment were allowed, since they would receive no payment during the period that the person was not enrolled. Whether people, and the providers who serve them, should pay extra because some people do not enroll in a free or near-free program even when it is available to them is a decision that involves balancing values and practical realities. Since the buy-in would be just one part of a broader set of social policies set by the states, and since the program would be optional, I would be inclined to let each state decide whether enrollment could occur at any time or just during an annual open enrollment period.
Measuring Success
The most basic measure of the program's success would be the degree to which the tax-credit program, with the buy-in option as one component, reduced the number of people without health insurance. A specific measure of the buy-in's success should be the degree to which the program keeps families intact as an insurance unit. Assuming that it would be at least somewhat successful in this regard, the program also would be a good source of data for determining if there were utilization and health outcome advantages for families who had a single source of coverage.
Program Weaknesses
A program that provides states with flexibility in design is always subject to the criticism that similarly situated children and families will be treated differently depending upon where they live. This seems a particularly weak criticism in the context of a tax credit, because insurance markets already vary so much around the country. Even without state flexibility, the credit would have tremendously varying benefits for people in different parts of the country.
A second criticism of state-flexible programs is that it is difficult to estimate costs prospectively. This is especially true when there is no cap on the federal outlay. But the state option merely affects the takeup rate of a program to which all people are entitled. States would not receive any more money from the federal government than the federal government would be paying to individuals eligible for the tax credit. Therefore, while it is difficult to know precisely how this program would look upon implementation, the cost consequences of the buy-in option should be modest. If tax credit outlays were higher than anticipated, this merely would demonstrate how difficult it is to project the costs of a broad tax credit, and should not be used to criticize the buy-in option itself.
Conclusion
The health insurance tax credits that have been proposed are significantly different from tax credits already in use. The EITC has the fairly straightforward goal of subsidizing the earnings of low-income families, while the dependent-care credit subsidizes a small share of a family's cost for a broad set of services. 9 Proponents of the health insurance credit have more ambitious goals. First, they hope to substantially increase demand for a specific product among low-income people, something that no other credit has attempted to do. Second, they plan to apply it in the arena of insurance, where incentives for risk segmentation are extremely strong and can unravel any benefit created. Third, except in the most ambitious proposals, the credit would complement an already existing entitlement for children and some adults with very low incomes.
There is no doubt that tax credits can shift incentives on the margin. If designed correctly, they also can equitably assist those who are viewed as engaging in socially beneficial behavior. These reasons, combined with their broad political appeal given the current fiscal situation and budget rules, suggest the tax-credit option should be taken seriously.
Only a few states have made subsidized health insurance coverage available to a significant portion of their population with incomes higher than those of the Medicaid population. This partly reflects how cumbersome the Section 1115 waiver process can be to negotiate. In addition, few states have been willing to commit large sums of money to subsidize coverage for this group out of tax revenues. While the buy-in option presented here is designed as an add-on to a tax-credit proposal, it easily could stand alone. That is, federal funds could be made available directly to states to develop and/or expand sliding-scale buy-in programs. This alternative has the advantage of building upon a model some states have tested and refined. It has the disadvantage of not providing families with a choice between public and private insurance coverage.
Tax credit proponents should pay as much attention to the insurance market for tax-credit-eligible families as they do to the intricacies of the credit's value and the circumstances under which it is available. If, as in the Zelenak (2001) proposal, the credit could not be applied toward employer-sponsored coverage, the credit would have to be taken to the nongroup market. This market operates with varying effectiveness in different states, but always has high administrative costs and is more volatile than the employer-based market.
It is worthwhile to consider how the nongroup market can be improved. It is equally important to ensure that those who cannot navigate this market or who are not served well by it-or who find it too different from the health care system they have used thus far, and feel uncomfortable making large payments into it-have a place to go. The buy-in option presented here provides that essential safety valve. It expands the value of the tax credit, not monetarily, but in other ways that may be just as important. It is a critical feature of any tax-credit plan. 1 While the proposal is for families and individuals, I generally use only the term families for ease of presentation. 2 Medicaid eligibility levels for children are set through a combination of federal and state policies, while SCHIP eligibility levels are at state discretion. In most states, public coverage for children is available up to incomes between 185% and 250% of the FPL. By contrast, Medicaid coverage for nondisabled adults is almost entirely limited to pregnant women and parents of children receiving cash assistance (TANF), for which income standards vary by state, with the median state offering coverage only up to 60% of the FPL. I use the 200% of the FPL break because it is representative, while actual values vary by state. 3 Presentations by high-level Bush Administration staff indicate that President Bush will propose a tax credit that need not be reconciled at year end. This provision would reduce the importance of the state as intermediary, but would not eliminate it, since it appears that it would only apply to people whose prior year income made them eligible for the credit. In addition, this provision may not survive the legislative process. 4 For states to bear the risk, individual tax returns would have to be reconciled for families that chose the buy-in option, and the difference between those reconciled values and the pay-out to states computed. This raises a few concerns. One is that families would not understand that the reconciliation information was only being used to compute their state's liability, not theirs. In addition, some buy-in participants certainly would fail to complete the reconciliation process (by not filling out a tax return or not filling out the appropriate portion). It seems inappropriate to penalize the state for this behavior, but risky to ignore it. In the end, prospective eligibility determinations by the states within federal standards is likely to be the best of the three options. 5 If the state chose to contract with managed care plans, what the plans think the relative risks of these two populations would be is more important than what the actual differences are. This is because plans would bid based upon their expectations. Over time, expectations and reality should converge, but at the outset they might be quite different. 6 There are other data issues as well. Medicaid enrollment in the reported data include anyone enrolled at any time during the year, not at a point in time. This makes perenrollee costs lower than they would be if they were calculated on an average caseload basis. If tax credits made enrollment more stable so people were covered while they were sick and while they were healthy, the Medicaid data as reported may be the appropriate comparison. If buy-in participation involved as much churning as Medicaid, per-person costs would be higher and states would not be able to afford as comprehensive a package of benefits. The family structure of new tax-credit users might differ from that of the existing Medicaid or privately insured population. Since the credit would be a flat amount per family, family structure would affect how far the credit would go toward purchasing insurance. Average Medicaid costs per child are low, relative to adults, but without knowing the family structure of taxcredit users, we cannot know what it would cost to provide the Medicaid package to those families. In addition, SCHIP benefits may be less expensive than Medicaid benefits, but systematic cost data are not yet available on this program. 7 An intuitively appealing way to address this possibility would be to bar those who are eligible for public coverage, not just those who are enrolled, from the tax credit. But this would be impossible to administer through the tax code, since the tax return does not have sufficient information to determine an individual's eligibility for Medicaid or SCHIP. 8 As noted previously, Medicaid eligibility cannot be determined based upon information on a tax return. An approximation is not good enough if we are interested in determining whether an individual should be eligible for the credit. However, a reasonable approximation could be made if it was solely for the purpose of determining how much money states have saved by shifting their Medicaid costs to the federally funded tax credit. 9 The EITC also has the goal of increasing work efforta goal more similar to what health insurance tax credits are supposed to accomplish. However, the fact that earnings are a continuous variable, while health insurance is discrete (you either have it or you don't), makes the dy-namics of the incentives created by these two credits quite different. Also, evidence on the labor market effects of the EITC is decidedly mixed.
Notes
